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Abstract
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the effect of board gender diversityon performance
of commercial banks in Kenya for the period 1998-2009. Stepwise regression was used to
analyze the effect of board diversity on performance. It was found that boards of commercial
banks in Kenya are male-dominated. On average, out of a typical board size of 8 members,
only 1 is a female director. Finally, this study finds that board diversity has no effect on
performance of banks in Kenya.
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1.1 Introduction
The board of directors is one form of internal control mechanisms in corporates since
the board members appoint, supervise and remunerate top managers in organizations in
addition to strategy formulation (Minguez and Campbell, 2010).  Over many years, studies
have investigated the effect of board composition on the performance of firms, majorly
focusing on the proportion of non-independent directors such as Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996), tenure of the board as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1991),shares held by directors as
done by Weisbach (1988), board size as investigated by Kini et al. (1995), and board
meetings studied by Vafeas (1999), Brick and Chidambaram (2007).
Recently, researchers have started investigating the effect of board diversity which is
described as the variation among its members (Coffey & Wang 1998). The areas of concern
have been expertise and managerial background, personalities, learning styles, education, age
and values.  This study focuses on board gender diversity as a component of board
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composition. The effect of this board attribute on performance of commercial banks is
analyzed. In corporate governance circles, board gender diversity is inclusion or presence of
female directors in the boards. This is the definition adopted by this study. This study focuses
on the commercial banks since few studies have been done on them as regards board
diversity (Tanna, Pasiouras, & Nnadi, 2006). Further to this, other non-financial sector
studies that have been undertaken in other countries cannot be generalized to commercial
banks as they are significantly different from their non-financial counterparts (Adams and
Mehran, 2003). The other reason the financial sector was picked is that majority of the
studies that have been carried out mostly dealt with multi-sectoral firms and hence mixed
findings established as posited by Randoy et al. (2006). In order to break away from that
practice this study sought to focus on one sector that is the financial sector. The financial
sector also was picked because the data for the study was easily available from the regulator
that is the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). Finally, this study has been motivated by the scanty
of literature that is found in the Kenyan context.
In Kenya, corporate boards including those of commercial banks are said to be male
dominated since the appointments are done in an old boy network (Business Daily, 2010).
Old boy network is whereby the male directors introduce their friends to boards before they
retire. The Institute of Directors of Kenya decries that this appointment process denies
majority of the women the chance to be selected to the corporate boards hence depriving the
organization this important resource. This therefore means the effect of a diverse board on
firm value as pointed out by Carter et al. (2003), Hambrick et al. (1996), Bohren & Strom
(2007) etc. may not be felt in the Kenyan context. However, this situation may not last
especially with the passing of the new constitution which requires female participation in
almost all spheres of life.
From that perspective, this paper aims  establishing the effect of gender diversity on
performance of banks in Kenya.
1.2 Problem statement
Board diversity as a corporate governance concept has recently caught the attention of
policymakers, managers, directors, shareholders, and academia (Johansen, 2008). Following
this interest, various studies have been undertaken to establish the effect of board diversity on
firm performance. These studies however, focus on the developed countries. Few studies
have been carried out in the developing countries, Kenya being included. The other thing that
European Scientific Journal April edition vol. 8, No.7 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
130
is evident from the studies from developed countries is that most of the studies focused on the
non-financial sector with very few actually dealing with the financial sector. In some cases,
the financial sector firms have been eliminated from the sample of firms under study in major
developed economies for instance, Minguez-Vera and Campbell (2008) doing a study in
Spain eliminated financial sector firms.
Notwithstanding, the findings from the non-financial sector studies have been
inconclusive which Randoy et al., (2006) argue is a result of country differences, legal and
cultural differences, timing, differences in firm performance measures. This therefore means
that the findings of these non-financial sector studies cannot be generalized to the financial
sector and do not adequately inform us of the relationship between board diversity and firm
performance in other sectors.
In Kenya for example, scanty of literature can be found on relationship between
gender diversity and bank performance with exception of Barako & Brown (2008). Barako
&Brown (2008) established that board diversity in Kenya’s banking industry leads to
improved corporate social reporting. This study however, focused on the relationship
between gender diversity and corporate social reporting in commercial banks.
But with the new constitution in place in Kenya, majority of women are likely to
participate actively in various activities including business management.  This study may
have been timely to establish what effect board diversity would have on performance with
specific focus on the business community. This comes in the backdrop of evidence that
gender diversity in boardrooms can add value to the firm by creating better client
relationships, risk and audit management (Gulamhussen & Santa, 2010).  This research seeks
to address all these by looking at board diversity in the commercial banks in Kenya.
2.1 Literature
2.1.1 A brief overview of the banking sector in Kenya
The banking industry in Kenya comprises of the Central Bank of Kenya as a
regulatory authority, commercial banks, non bank financial institutions, Forex bureaus and
deposit taking microfinance institutions (Central Bank of Kenya Banking Supervision Report,
2009). At the moment there are 46 financial institutions in the banking industry of which 44
are commercial banks and 2 are mortgage finance companies. Furthermore, there is 1 deposit
taking microfinance institution and 130 Forex bureaus (Ibid, 2009). The commercial banks
and mortgage finance companies are licensed and regulated under the Banking Act and
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Prudential Guidelines. On the other hand deposit taking microfinance companies are licensed
and regulated under the Microfinance Act. Forex bureaus are licensed and regulated under the
Central Bank of Kenya Act and Forex Bureau Guidelines
Of the 46 financial institutions, 33 are locally owned and 13 are foreign owned. The
locally owned comprises 3 banks with public shareholding, 28 privately owned commercial
banks and 2 mortgage finance companies. The foreign owned financial institutions comprised
9 locally incorporated foreign banks and 4 branches of foreign incorporated banks (Central
Bank of Kenya Banking Supervision Report, 2009).
2.1.2 Corporate governance in Kenya
Corporate governance has gained prominence in Kenya as is the case in other
countries. This has been caused partly by corporate failure or poor performance of public and
private companies (Barako et al., 2006). Corporate governance framework in Kenya is
advocated by the Center for Corporate Governance Kenya which is an affiliate of the
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (Ibid, 2006).
It is well understood that the first attempt to bring into focus the corporate governance
framework in Kenya started in 1999 when the Center for Corporate Governance Kenya
developed a framework which was voluntary for companies to adopt. The framework
developed by this center was further taken up by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in
2000 as draft corporate governance practices for listed companies in Kenya. In later years the
CMA made it mandatory for the listed companies to adopt those corporate governance
practices. These corporate governance practices mainly dealt with the issues of the board
such as board composition, role of audit committee, separation of the role of Chief Executive
Officer and the chair. In addition, they focused on the rights of the shareholders.
The banking industry in Kenya is highly regulated. The Central Bank of Kenya
specifies the corporate governance practices to be adopted by all commercial banks operating
in Kenya. The central bank requires all licensed banks to adopt practices like having at least
five directors of which three-fifths should be independent directors; having board
committees; directors not having multiple directorships in more than two licensed institutions
among others (Central Bank of Kenya Prudential Report, 2006).
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2.1.3 Board gender diversity
Board gender diversity is the presence of female directors in corporate boards of
directors (Dutta & Bose 2007);(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008);(Nguyen et al. n.d.).  The
participation of women in the labor market has grown since 1980 although this has not been
matched with the improvement in quality of employment (ILO, 2007). In many European
countries the participation of women in the labor market is lower as compared to men
(Curdova, 2005). This is a common phenomenon in majority of countries including Spain
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008). Alongside this, gender representation in boardrooms
gained impetus in the early 2003 after the release of Higgs Report on good corporate
governance in the UK. Despite the release of the Higgs Report, company boards remain
largely male dominated (Grosvold et al., 2007). Of late this has come to change especially in
developed economies. For example, in the US, female representation in boards increased
from 3.7% to 8.6% from 1993 to 2003 (Conyon & Mallin 1997; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).
Such an increasing trend has also been experienced in UK where female directors have
doubled since 1999 (Grosvold et al. 2007). It is believed that the change in board gender
diversity is as a result of partly the implementation of equal opportunity programs which are
a bit problematic to implement in senior management (Grosvold et al., 2007).
Globally, there have been a number of studies which paid attention on the gender
diversity of corporate boards recently e.g. Burke, (1999), Sheridan & Milgate, (2003), Farrell
& Hersch 2005). Burke’s (1999) study of the leading three hundred and fifty companies in
Canada showed that small number of women was being represented on Canadian boards and
the relationship between female presence on the corporate board and firm size, where larger
boards had far more women. Sheridan & Milgate (2003) surveyed Australian listed
companies and found that men favored homogeneity at the board level, while women were
advocating diversity. At the time of Sheridan & Milgate’s (2003) study, a paltry 3.4% of
Australian board directors were women. Farrell & Hersch (2005) studied Fortune 500 and
Service 500 companies to establish how gender influenced board selection. It was found out
that women were added to the board until the company’s diversity goal was met and that once
they were pleased that bare minimum adequate female board representation was ensured,
they no longer looked to increase the number of female directors.
Gender representation in boardrooms has been determined to vary by country. In
countries where affirmative action is already in place like Norway and Sweden, female
directors are higher than those countries without. In fact, compared with UK, Norway has
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50% more female directors (Grosvold et al. 2007). A listing of countries with the respective
statistics of female directors in the year 2009 is provided in appendix 4. Interestingly, no
statistics for Kenya is provided in that appendix. In Africa, limited studies have been carried
out to show female representation on the board. The few studies obtained show the same
trend as in other western developed countries for instance in South Africa in 2005 only 11.5%
of the board positions were held by women (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008). At the same
time, (Williams 2001) found out that in South Africa’s public listed companies the female
directors were either one or two and that those firms with no female directors were far more
than those in developed economies.
In Kenya, statistics on gender representation in boards of directors are scanty.
However, scattered data and some anecdotal evidence reports that Kenyan boards are
overwhelmingly male dominated (Business daily, 2010). This is not different from the UK
situation as found out by Grosvold et al. (2007). This, in Kenya, as provided by the anecdotal
evidence is believed to arise from the recruitment process which is referred as old -boy
network. The old boy network is whereby the old members of the boards introduce their own
friends to be board members before they retire. At the same time it is believed that the
corporate scene is male dominated because of inadequacy of the nominating committees as
recommended by the Capital Markets Authority (Ibid, 2010).
In terms of the banking industry gender representation in boards of selected European
countries is shown in appendix 5. From the two tables (i.e. tables 2.1 and 2.2 in appendices 4
and 5), statistics point that the proportion of female directors in the banking industry is far
below that of all sectors. This is even reflected in the countries in which gender diversity is
mandatory e.g. Norway and Sweden but still the proportion in these countries is higher as
compared to other countries.
2.1.4 Why board gender diversity?
The effect of gender diversity on firm performance is inconclusive given the findings
of various studies that have been undertaken worldwide. Although the effect is not clear,
many theories have been put forward explaining why gender diversity may have effect on the
firm value. First, Robinson & Dechant (1997) through their intuitive reasoning argue that
firms that are diverse in the board rooms tend to outperform those that are less diverse. They
argued that diversity promotes better understanding of the marketplace by matching the
diversity of directors to that of customers and employees hence increasing market
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penetrability. It is also argued that gender diversity leads to creativity and innovation as these
features are not randomly distributed in the population (Ibid, 1997), hence bringing about
changes in firm performance.
Carter et al. (2003) explain the relationship between board gender diversity and firm
performance based on the agency theory and they posit that board gender diversity enhances
the board’s ability to monitor top management. In addition to this, they argue that increasing
the number of female directors may increase board’s independence since women tend to ask
questions that male directors may not ask.
In addition, Smith et al. (2006), posit that board gender diversity enhances problem
solving as a variety of perspectives arise hence more alternatives are evaluated in the process.
Furthermore, a more gender diverse board may also improve a firm’s competitive advantage
provided it improves the image of the firm and if this has a positive effect on customers’
behavior and thus on a firm’s performance (Smith et al., 2006).
In western economies diversity issues have taken centre stage because of the
following reasons; first, many institutional investors are implementing diversity aspects as
part of their investment practices and commitment to diversity in employment is part of
socially responsible investment indices (Throsvold et al., 2007). Also board gender diversity
is desired by customers, employees and other stakeholders since it demonstrates the
sensitivity of management to stakeholder preferences, aspirations and concerns (Ibid, 2007).
Lastly, board gender diversity has been the subject of discussions for best practices in
corporate governance.
For example, the Higgs Report on the role and effectiveness of non-executive
directors highlights the fact that “… the current population of non-executive directors is
narrowly drawn” (Higgs, 2003), and argues that “… a commitment to equal opportunities …
is inevitably undermined if the board itself does not follow the same guiding principles”
(Higgs, 2003).
There are also arguments that increased board gender diversity might decrease firm
performance. Earley and Mosakowski (2000) argue that members of homogeneous groups
communicate more frequently as they are more likely to share similar opinions. Likewise,
Tajfel and Turner (1985) and Williams and O’Reilly (1998) argue that homogeneous groups
are cooperative and have less touching conflicts.
However, if greater board gender diversity generates more conflicting opinions,
decision-making becomes time consuming and less effective (Lau and Murnighan 1998).
However, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) report that women are more cooperative than men,
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although Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) posit that the converse is also true.  Conflicts in
the boardroom may be determined by the degree of humanity inherent in male and female
behaviour: Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) argue that men are more altruistic than women
when the cost of altruism is low and that the converse is true when this cost is high.
A further reason supporting the observation that greater board gender diversity is
related with lower firm performance can be found in the arguments of Jianakoplos and
Bernasek (1998) that women are more risk-averse than men, while Cox and Blake (1991)
explain that women increase the costs of the firm as a result of higher turnover and
absenteeism. Greater gender diversity may negatively affect the performance of the firm if
women directors are appointed as ‘‘tokens’’ rather than for their competence. In this accord,
Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s theory of tokenism is applicable. Kanter concluded that the life of
female employees in the company is influenced by the proportions in which they find
themselves (Kanter 1977). She went on to define a ratio of 85:15 as a theoretical benchmark
where members of the majority (85% or more) were ‘‘dominants’’ while the remaining
minorities (15% or less) were ‘‘tokens’’. However, she explains that women who are
appointed as ‘‘tokens’’ may not necessarily have a negative impact on firm performance.
Kanter points out that such kind of employees may find themselves under more
pressure to show their professional worth as compared to their dominant counterparts and
they also have to work harder to receive recognition for their achievements. Further, women
directors who perceive themselves to be ‘‘tokens’’, and thus to be indicative of their gender,
may be motivated to perform well not just for themselves but because of the figurative
consequences of their activities.
A setback that may confront women in business, whether their status is ‘‘token’’ or
not, is an unseen obstacle called a ‘‘glass ceiling’’ which inhibits promotion beyond a certain
point. In regard to men,  Williams (1992) found that males working in the female-dominated
occupations of nursing, teaching, librarianship, and social work did not face discrimination as
‘‘tokens’’ but receive benefits that enhance their careers hence enabling them  to rise on a
‘‘glass escalator’’ to the top. Another problem faced by women is the so-called ‘‘glass cliff’’
that they may be confronted with when they achieve high profile positions (Campbell and
Minguez-Vera, 2010). Evidence points to the fact that women are more likely to be promoted
to leadership positions after a period of dismal firm performance, hence diminishing their
chances of achieving future success (Ryan and Haslam, 2005).
Without considering the possible presence of unseen  (‘‘glass’’) ceilings, escalators or
cliffs, boards with high levels of gender diversity may encourage directors of the same gender
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to more strongly identify themselves with each other’s opinions, thus increasing the chance of
conflict (Richard et al. 2004). This can be problematic if a firm competes in a highly
aggressive industry where quick reaction is required (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Even
though, the decisions of a more gender diverse board may be of a higher quality, this may be
outweighed by the adverse effects of a slow decision-making (Hambrick et al. 1996).
2.1.5 Board gender diversity and firm performance
Gender, as one of the governance issues highlighted by Carter, Simkins and Simpson
(2003) is the current issue facing shareholders, managers and directors alike in the modern
corporate environment. This issue has been brought to the public limelight through the media,
advocacy groups and even public policies from investors (mostly institutional investors).
Despite this pressure on modern corporations, the existing studies on the impact of
board gender diversity on firm performance show mixed results (Rand\oy et al. 2006).The
association between board gender diversity and firm performance shows inconclusive
evidence in the non-financial sector studies. The effect of board gender diversity on firm
performance is believed to arise because of the benefits that accompany board gender
diversity. This was explained intuitively by Robinson & Dechant (1997). It is argued that this
diversity promotes a better understanding of the marketplace in which a firm operates.
Since the marketplace itself is diverse, gender diversity will make it easy for firms to
penetrate these markets. Robinson & Dechant (1997) also noted that gender diversity in
boards increase creativity and innovation. This view therefore states that the attitudes, beliefs
and cognitive functioning of humans are not distributed in a random pattern but appear to be
systematically distributed with variables like gender, race and age. It is further noted that
diversity especially in terms of gender leads to greater problem solving. This is because many
alternatives are carefully evaluated in terms of pros and cons.
Some researchers have actually established that a board that is diverse in terms of
gender is likely to have positive impact on its performance.  For instance, (Erhardt et al.
2003) established that a company that has got women and minority groups as part of its
directors tend to have positive impact on performance. Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, (2003),
carried their study in the US for a period six years starting from 1993 to 1998. The
performance here was measured by return on assets and return on investment. Their study as
well looked at large companies in all the industries in the US. Even though, the findings of
this study were positive, it will be hard to attribute the positive results to women directors
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only as minorities are also included. The minority could even be male directors who come
from minority tribes or groups.
Several other researchers have come to the same conclusion that board gender
diversity has positive effect on firm performance. Minguez-Vera & Campbell (2008) for
instance, found this to be the case in Spain. Even though firm performance was measured by
Tobin’s Q, the results were similar to those of accounting measures like return on assets and
return on investment. This study however did not consider all firms in Spain in that financial
sector firms were eliminated from the sample. This study also focused on only companies
listed on the continuous market of Madrid.
Other authors, in particular those from Australia have established that gender diversity
is positively related to firm value e.g. (Nguyen et al. n.d.); (Bonn 2004). Firm value was
measured by Tobin’s Q. These studies involved large firms on the Australian stock exchange
for a period of two years from 2000 to 2001. They also applied 2SLS methodology in its
analysis of the effect of gender on performance.
In as much different studies from different countries have established positive impact
of board gender diversity on firm performance, others still established negative impact. This
shows how inconclusive the concept of gender diversity is. For instance, (Bøhren & Strøm
2007) established negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance
for the Norwegian firms. This is in contrast to other studies in the Scandinavian countries
which established no relationship at all e.g. (Rand\oy et al. 2006). Randoy et al. (2006) while
undertaking a study in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden established
that gender diversity in corporate boards do not have any effect on the performance of the
firms. They measured performance by the return on assets. This came on the backdrop of a
push to have female directors to occupy at least 40% of the board seats in these Nordic
countries.
At the same time, a study by (Rose 2007) in Denmark established similar results to
those of Randoy et al. (2006) that board diversity has no effect on firm performance. Rose’s
study however focused on listed companies and employed Tobin’s Q as its performance
measure as opposite to Randoy et al. (2006) who employed returns on assets. This study as
well focused on country only. Contrary to the studies of Randoy et al. (2006) and Rose,
(2007)(N. Smith et al. 2006) established that board gender diversity has a positive effect on
performance of firms in Denmark. Their study focused on the large 2500 Danish firms during
the period 1993-2001. However, their study used performance measures such as gross value
added to net turnover, profit on ordinary operations to net turnover, ordinary result to net
European Scientific Journal April edition vol. 8, No.7 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
138
assets and net result after tax to net assets which may be considered weak. One thing that is
common among these studies from Scandinavian countries is that they majorly focused on
non-financial firms.
Other studies that found no relationship between gender diversity and firm
performance include Kochan et al. (2003) while studying the US firms. At the same time
shrader et al. (1997) studying still US firms found no significant effect of gender diversity in
top management and firm value, though negative effects were found in some cases. This is in
contrast to studies of (Erhardt et al. 2003); (Carter et al. n.d.); Catalyst, (2004) which
established significantly positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm
performance.
Majority of the studies on financial sector do not deal with board gender diversity
rather on other board attributes such as board size, board composition among others. In one
study carried out in Ghana, Adusei (2010) established that board size has an effect on
performance in banks. He alluded to the fact that small boards have positive effect on
performance of the firm as measured by return on equity. In yet another study on board size,
Staikouras et al. (2007) established among the 58 banks in Europe that large boards hurt the
performance of banks. This therefore means that the smaller the board the higher the
performance of the bank. In as much as some studies have established that board size has an
effect on performance, other studies also such as those of Adams and Mehran (2005); Belkhir
(2009), found no effect between board size and firm performance. Specifically, Belkhir
(2009) while carrying a study on 174 US bank and savings institutions did not report any
positive relationship between board size and performance as measured  by Tobin’s Q.
Looking at board composition, Staikouras et al. (2007) find that board composition
does not affect firm performance although its relationship with performance was found to be
positive. These findings were similar to those of Adusei (2010) who found no relationship
between board composition and bank performance in Ghana although board composition was
found to have positive effect on bank efficiency. At the same time, Alonso and Gonzalez
(2006) studied 66 banks in OECD countries from 1996 to 2003. They established an inverted
U shaped relation between the measures of bank performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA, the annual
market return of a bank shareholder) and board size which they posit justifies a large board
but imposing an efficient limit on size.
Their findings as well indicate a positive relation between the non-executive directors
and performance. Moreover, Busta (2007) sampled 69 listed banks from the EU banking
sectors over the period 1996-2005 and 125 banks operating in EU-15 and Switzerland during
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2004.  The findings for the 69 listed banks indicate that a higher presence of outside directors
on boards perform better in terms of the market-to-book value and return on invested capital,
in Continental Europe, while negative results were obtained in the case of UK banks.
Busta (2007) finds no evidence of a significant association between board
composition and ROA. At the same time, the effect of the board size, although positive, was
insignificant in all cases. The results from the 125 banks show that board size has a positive
relationship with the market-to-book ratio and return on investment capital and negatively
related to return on assets; however it is insignificant in most cases.
Zulkafli and Samad (2007) examined 107 banks in 9 Asian markets in 2004. Their
findings suggest no significant relationship between performance measures (e.g. return on
assets and Tobin’s Q) and the board size or composition. Lastly, based on a sample of large
publicly traded US banks, Pi and Timme (1993) reported that cost efficiency and return on
assets are insignificantly related to the percentage of inside (outside) directors.
For the few financial sector studies that focused on board gender diversity, the results
points to a positive relationship between bank performance and the presence of female
directors in boards. Gulamhussen & Santa (2010) established a positive relationship between
bank performance and board gender diversity among the OECD countries banking industry.




This study is considered correlational since it  attempts to analyze relationship
between gender diversity and bank performance. Further to this, the study is explanatory in
nature as it establishes whether gender diversity, in combination with other controlled
variables, causes bank performance to change.
The effect of gender diversity on bank performance was analyzed over a twelve-year
period from 1998 to 2009. This period was picked because to establish the real effect of
gender diversity on bank performance at least two new boards have to be considered. And
since a board has a life span of six years, it follows then that a full board is constituted after
every six years. Therefore, two boards constitute twelve years hence the study period.
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3.1.3 Population and Sampling
The target population for this study is the forty four commercial banks in Kenya as
per the Central Bank of Kenya’s Banking Supervision Report of 2009. All the forty four
commercial banks are studied since they are few in number hence a census survey study. But
since the data required for this study is from 1998 to 2009, 12 commercial banks were
eliminated as they had incomplete data for the twelve- year period under consideration.
3.1.4 Data Description and Collection
The data for this paper was obtained from secondary sources. Secondary sources
encompassed financial data from financial statements of the commercial banks. This was
taken because this type of data was easily accessible from the Central Bank Kenya (CBK)
and the Banking Survey Reports of 2008 and 2010.
3.1.5 Data Analysis
Stepwise regression model is used to analyze the quantitative data collected in this
study. Regression was used because it was the most common model used by many
researchers. Also regression can be used to show the relationship between variables. It does
not only show positive, negative or no relationship but also tells the strength of that
relationship (Jonson and Kuby, 2007). Specifically, stepwise regression was used as it was
anticipated that there would be some inter-relation among some independent variables.
4.1Results/Findings
4.1.1 Presence of female directors
After undertaking stepwise regression, some of the variables which were not
significant in the model were dropped leaving only those that were significant. These
variables had been applied by other researchers in different countries as control variables for
bank profitability. Therefore, the following control variables were dropped: Loan to total
deposits ratio (LODP), age of the bank (Bage), Board of directors’ size (BoS), bank size
(BS), loan to asset ratio (LA), net interest to total asset ratio (NIMTA) and lastly listing status
of the bank (Lstatus). These variables seem to have no explanatory power on the performance
of the bank as measured by return on assets.
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Board diversity was measured as presence of female directors taking a value of one if
the bank has at least one female director and zero otherwise. The last step in the stepwise
regression is used in analysis. The initial regression model was as follows:
),,,,,( CIRLNTDPEALLPOEFDfROAit 
From table 4.7 below, the relationship between presence of female directors and ROA
is depicted to be negative with a coefficient of 0.0007. Its t-statistic is -0.29 whereas the
corresponding p-value is 0.774.
Table 4.1: Regression output with ROA as predictor and presence of female directors
as independent variable
Independent
variables Coefficient T-statistic P-value
Intercept -0.04520
FD -0.0007 -0.29 0.774
CIR -0.0921 -20.99 0.000**
OE 0.155 7.54 0.000**
EA 0.105 9.70 0.000**
LLP -0.0142 -4.59 0.000**





The significance of the coefficients is obtained using p-values with ** denoting significance
at 5% Source: 1998-2009 data (author)
4.1.2 Proportion of female directors
Another measure of board diversity was proportion of female directors (PFD). This
was included in a regression model as follows;
),,,,( LNTDPEALLPOEPFDfROAit 
After regressing ROA against the independent and control variables, some of the
variables were dropped automatically by the stepwise regression. The variables that were
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dropped included bank size (BS), board of directors’ size (BoS), listing status of the bank
(Lstatus), Loan to asset ratio (LA), net interest to total asset ratio (NIMTA) and age of the
bank (Bage).
These were the same variables that were dropped when ROA was regressed against
the measure for presence of female directors (FD) and other control variables.
As shown in table 4.2 below;
Table 4.2: Regression output with ROA as predictor and Proportion of Female
Directors as independent variable
Independent
variables Coefficient T-statistic P-value
Intercept -0.05588
PFD -0.018 -1.47 0.143
CIR -0.0919 -21.0 0.000**
OE 0.153 7.50 0.000**
EA 0.106 9.79 0.000**
LLP -0.0141 -4.59 0.000**





The significance of the coefficients is obtained using p-values with ** denoting significance
at 5%
Source: 1998-2009 data (author)
The Proportion of female directors was found to have negative relationship with bank
performance just as was the case with presence of female directors on the board. However,
proportion of female directors had a higher coefficient value (0.018) compared to that of
presence of the female directors (0.0007). The coefficient of percentage of female directors
(0.018) is found to be insignificant based on its p-value which is 0.143. The other control
variables and their respective coefficients and p-values are as shown in the table.
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These findings suggest that board diversity is negatively, although not statistically
significant, related to performance of banks in Kenya. These are similar to the findings of
(Gulamhussen & Santos n.d.) who established that the presence of women on the board is
negatively related to the risk taking measures in the bank although it was significant in their
case. On the effect of board gender diversity on bank performance based on the p-values
(0.774 and 0.143), the study established that board gender diversity has no effect on bank
performance in the Kenyan context. The findings of this study confirm the findings of other
empirical studies carried out in different countries. Although the empirical studies in these
other countries were not based on the banking industry the results are similar. For instance,
Shrader et al (1997) established in the US that board diversity has no effect on firm
performance. This is similar to the study of Smith et al (2006) which found no significant
relationship between board gender diversity and various accounting measures in Denmark.
Other studies whose findings are confirmed by this study are those of Rose (2007); Randoy et
al. (2006); Du Rietz and Henrekson (2000). At the same time De Cabo et al. (2009) found out
that among the European Union Banks the proportion of women on the board had no
significant differences in relation to ROA. The implication of these findings as noted by
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008) is that the presence of female directors is not punished by
the business community since its effect is not significant on the performance of the bank.
In the banking industry, the findings of this study are in-consistent with some of the
empirical studies carried out. For example, (Gulamhussen & Santos n.d.) who found positive
and statistically significant relationship between female directors and performance measures
like return on assets and return on equity. The coefficients of the control variables are as
follows:  CIR =-0.0921, -0.0919; EA= 0.105, 0.106; LLP= -0.0142, -0.0141; OE= 0.155,
0.153; LNTDP= 0.00418, 0.00467.
These coefficients are arranged starting with those obtained when presence of female
directors is used as explanatory variable and followed by those obtained when proportion of
female directors was used as explanatory variable respectively. All these coefficients are
significant based on their respective p-values as shown in tables 4.4 and 4.5. The cost to
income ratio was found to have a negative relationship with ROA. This implies that the
higher CIR ratio the lower the performance of the bank as measured by ROA. The equity to
asset ratio is positively related to ROA meaning the higher the leverage position for the bank
the higher the performance. Meanwhile the positive relationship between total deposits and
performance of banks as posited by Adusei (2010) is confirmed by this study since the
relationship between ROA and total deposits.
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The theory put forward by Grammatikos and Saunders (1990), Madura and Zarruk
(1992) with regard to the quality of credit of the bank and profitability is also being
confirmed in this study. The loan loss provision is used to capture the quality of credit. The
theory states that the higher the loan loss provision the lower the credit quality and hence the
lower the profitability. In this study the loan loss provision was found to be negatively related
to ROA implying that the higher the loan loss provision the lower the ROA hence confirming
the theory.
With regard to equity to asset ratio, the coefficient was found to be positive. This
implies that the higher this ratio the higher the ROA. Equity to asset ratio is a measure of
financial leverage of a bank. The relationship found in this study between equity asset ratio
and ROA is consistent with findings of Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992)
who observed the positive relationship between equity to asset ratio and bank profitability.
Looking at the effect of overhead efficiency on profitability, the study found out that the
overhead efficiency ratio has a positive relationship with ROA implying that the higher the
ratio the higher the performance of the bank. This is consistent with the findings of
Staikouras et al (2009) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992).
5.1 Conclusion
One of the main findings of this study is that board gender diversity has no significant
effect on the performance of banks. This is shown by a statistically insignificant relationship
between board gender diversity and bank performance. These findings suggest that diversity
could be an important corporate governance concept in other business facets as opposed to
boardrooms. Whatever measure that could be taken to improve gender diversity in boards
may not be seen negatively by the business community since it does not have any effect on
the bottom-line of banks. This is consistent with Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) who
suggested in Spain that the market does not punish firms that have included female directors
on the boards since board gender diversity was found to have no effect on performance.
These findings could be like this may be because majority of the boards are male dominated
and the few women that are on the board may not be having any influence on the strategies of
the bank. It would to interesting to see what would happen if the numbers female directors
were to increase dramatically.
Majority of the banks had no female director on their boards. And for those who had
female directors on their boards the number was so small. Majority of those banks had only
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one female director which could point to tokenism as explained by Kanter (1977). Tokenism
is whereby percentages of representation in the community fall below 15%, those who are
different are seen as representing their category rather than being seen as individual, because
they are so unusual (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). Tokens are always accommodated by
having public face at work while keeping private face hidden. Since women on the board are
minority it points then that women are tokens in the banking industry giving a hand to the
tokenism theory.
Another possible interpretation of this phenomenon could be that there may be glass
ceiling in majority of the banks in Kenya. Since board members are the most senior people in
organization as some of them rise above the ranks and become board members. If this is the
case, then may female employees face glass ceiling (i.e. promotion to a certain level but not
beyond) in those organizations(Williams 1992).
Few women on the board may have come about also because may be women in
general do not have the necessary training and experience to work in the financial sector.
Although, in one study in the UK, it was established that number of female directors on the
boards of finance and utilities and transport industry was higher as compared to other
industries (Grosvold et al. (2007). The findings on the number of female directors on the
Kenyan boards could also point to the fact there is a glass ceiling on women in many
organizations.
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